We prove the existence of a perfect equilibrium within a class of compact, metric, and possibly discontinuous games. Our conditions for existence are easily verified in a variety of economic games.
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of "slightly constrained" rational behavior, or what could be observed if the players were to interact within the perturbed game. In this regard, a Nash equilibrium that is not perfect cannot be a good prediction of equilibrium behavior under any "conceivable" theory of (improbable, but not impossible) imperfect choice. Ever since it was coined by Selten [21] , perfectness has been a popular solution concept. However, the fact that Selten's treatment is valid only for finite games poses a problem, since many strategic settings are most naturally modeled as games with a continuum of actions (models of price and spatial competition (Bertrand [8] , Hotelling [15] ), auctions (Milgrom and Weber [16] ), patent races (Fudenberg et al. [13] ), etc.).
There have been attempts to use the notion of perfectness in infinite economic games to rule out undesirable equilibria (e.g., provision of public goods (Bagnoli and Lipman [4] ), credit markets with adverse selection (Broecker [9] ), budget-constrained sequential auctions (Pitchik and Schotter [19] ), principal-agent problems (Allen [2] )).
1 However, absent a theory of perfectness for infinite games (and given that a well-accepted formulation for finite games has long been available), there has been a general tendency to study the set of perfect equilibria in discretized, successively larger versions of the original (infinite) game at hand (e.g., Bagnoli and Lipman [4] , Broecker [9] ).
2 While this is a legitimate approach to perfectness in infinite games, it has been argued by Simon and Stinchcombe [22] that it has some limitations. Moreover, since there are alternative formulations of perfectness for infinite games, confining attention to the "limit-of-finite" approach, without any comparison with other concepts, seems unsatisfactory.
For continuous games, Simon and Sinchcombe [22] offer several notions of perfectness and compare their properties. However, infinite economic games often exhibit discontinuities in their payoffs (for instance, most of the above references feature discontinuous games), and a treatment for this kind of games is not available. In the presence of discontinuities, existence of perfect equilibria is not guaranteed by standard arguments. This paper is an attempt to address the issue of existence for an infinite-game extension of Selten's [21] original notion of perfectness, an extension that corresponds to Simon and Stinchcombe's [22] strong approach to perfectness when the universe of games is restricted by continuity of the players' payoffs. Building on the existence results obtained here, a companion paper, [10] , compares the properties of various notions of perfectness within families of discontinuous games, and states the analogue of the standard characterization of perfect equilibrium for finite games (e.g. van Damme [24] , p. 28), in terms of the strong approach and other formulations. This characterization is restated in Section 2.
We first illustrate that the existence of perfect equilibria crucially relies on the existence of Nash equilibria in Selten perturbations, i.e., games in which the players choose any strategy in their action space with positive probability. In infinite, discontinuous games, the peculiarities of the topological structure of strategy spaces in Selten perturbations prevent a straightforward application of the results available in the literature on the existence of Nash equilibria. In fact, we show (in Section 2) that Selten perturbations need not inherit Reny's [20] better-reply security from the original game. Even the available strengthenings of better-reply security-payoff security or uniform payoff security, along with upper semicontinuity of the sum of payoffs-do not generally give better-reply security in Selten perturbations. Thus, one must either rely on an appropriate generalization of the main existence theorem of Reny [20] or impose a suitable strengthening of better-reply security. We seek conditions on the payoffs of a game that prove useful in applications and imply better-reply security-and hence the existence of equilibria-in Selten perturbations. Ideally, to avoid dealing with expected payoffs (defined on mixed strategies) and the weak convergence of measures, one would like to have conditions that can be verified using the payoffs of the original game (and not its mixed extension).
We introduce a condition that serves our purpose. Roughly speaking, this condition is satisfied when there exists, for each player i, a measurable map f : X i → X i , where X i represents the action space for player i, with the following two properties: (1) for each pure strategy x i of player i, there is an alternative pure strategy f (x i ) such that given any pure action profile y −i of the other players, the action f (x i ) virtually guarantees the payoff player i receives at (x i , y −i ), even if the other players slightly deviate from y −i ; and (2) given any pure action profile y −i of the other players, there is a subset of generic elements of X i (which may depend on y −i ) such that given any generic pure strategy x i of player i, the action profile (x i , z −i ), where z −i is a slight deviation from y −i , virtually guarantees the payoff player i receives at (f (x i ), z −i ).
We show that this condition gives payoff security of certain Selten perturbations (Lemma 2). We then combine this finding with known results to establish the existence of perfect equilibria in discontinuous games (Theorem 2). In addition, we derive corollaries of these results in terms of two independent conditions-generic entire payoff security and generic local equi-upper semicontinuity-that imply the existence of a map f with the above properties. The alternative hypothesis does not explicitly require the measurability of the map f , and proves easy to verify in applications.
The hypotheses of the main existence theorems are satisfied in many economic games and are often rather simple to verify. This is exemplified in Section 3.
Perturbed games and perfect equilibria
, where N is a finite number of players, each X i is a nonempty metric space, and each u i : X → R is bounded and Borel measurable, with X := × N i=1 X i . If in addition each X i is compact, G is called a compact metric game. If each X i is a nonempty compact subset of a Hausdorff space, we say that G is a compact Hausdorff game.
In the sequel, by X −i we mean the set × j =i X j , and, given i, x i ∈ X i , and x −i = (x 1 , ..., x i−1 , x i+1 , ..., x N ) ∈ X −i , we slightly abuse notation and represent the point (x 1 , ..., x N ) as (x i , x −i ).
The mixed extension of G is the game
, where each M i represents the set of Borel probability measures on X i , endowed with the weak* topology, and U i : M → R is defined by
Henceforth, the set × j =i M j is denoted as M −i , and given i, µ i ∈ M i , and
we sometimes represent the point (µ 1 , ..., µ N ) as (µ i , µ −i ). Given x i ∈ X i , let δ x i be the Dirac measure on X i with support {x i }. We sometimes write, by a slight abuse of notation,
(1 − δ)ν + δµ denotes the point
where ν = (ν 1 , ..., ν N ) and µ = (µ 1 , ..., µ N ).
A number of definitions of trembling-hand perfectness for infinite normalform games have been proposed (cf. Simon and Stinchcombe [22] , Al-Najjar [3] ). For continuous games, the refinement specification considered here is equivalent to the strong approach in [22] and to the formulation in [3] . In this paper, we focus on the issue of existence. In passing, we also illustrate certain limitations of what appears to be a natural approach to the question of existence of perfect equilibria in discontinuous games. This is done more transparently if we frame our discussion in terms of just one notion of perfectness. A companion paper, [10] , compares the various notions of perfectness and studies their properties, and contains the analogue of the standard three-way characterization of perfectness for finite games (e.g. van Damme [24] , p. 28), which will be stated here after several definitions.
Before presenting the formal definition of perfectness, we need some terminology.
A Borel probability measure µ i on Y i ⊆ X i is said to be strictly positive
For each i, let M i stand for the set of all strictly positive members of
is called a Selten perturbation of G. We often work with perturbations G δν satisfying δ 1 = · · · = δ N . When referring to these objects, we simply write
A strategy profile x ∈ X is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of G if δ x is a Nash equilibrium of G.
Definition 2.
A strategy profile µ ∈ M is a trembling-hand perfect (thp) equilibrium of G if there are sequences (δ n ), (ν n ), and (µ n ) with (0, 1) N δ n → 0, ν n ∈ M , and µ n → µ, where each µ n is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game G δ n ν n .
In words, µ is a thp equilibrium of G if it is the limit of some sequence of exact equilibria of neighboring Selten perturbations of G. Intuitively, Selten perturbations of G may be interpreted as "models of mistakes," i.e., formal descriptions of strategic interactions where any player may "tremble" and play any one of her actions. The requirement that µ be the limit of some sequence of equilibria of perturbations of G says that there exists at least one model of (low-probability) mistakes that has at least one equilibrium close to µ, so that µ is an approximate description of what the players would do (at the said equilibrium) were they to interact in the perturbed game. Remark 1. Note that, in Definition 2, we do not require that µ be a Nash equilibrium of G. It is well-known that, for continuous games, the fact that a strategy profile µ is the limit of some sequence of equilibria of Selten perturbations of G guarantees that µ is a Nash equilibrium of G. While we do not impose continuity of the payoff functions, we shall show that our conditions also ensure that the limit point is an equilibrium. n is an exact equilibrium of the perturbed game G δ n ν n . Should one insist upon requiring that these equilibria be exact? While letting each µ n be an nequilibrium (with ( n , δ n ) → 0) would still give a (weak) refinement of Nash equilibrium, any Nash equilibrium would survive this weakening of Definition 2. In fact, given a Nash For µ ∈ M , let Br i (µ) denote player i's set of best responses in M i to the vector of strategies µ:
Consider the following distance function between members of M i :
Definition 3 (Simon and Stinchcombe [22] ). Given > 0, a strongperfect equilibrium of G is a vector µ ∈ M such that for each i,
A strategy profile in G is a strong perfect equilibrium of G if it is the weak* limit as n → 0 of strong n -perfect equilibria.
The following result is taken from Carbonell-Nicolau [10] and establishes the relationship between trembling-hand perfectness and strong perfectness in the presence of payoff discontinuities. The equivalence of (1)- (3) is analogous to the standard characterization of perfect equilibria for finite games (e.g. van Damme [24] , p. 28).
Theorem 1. For a metric game, the following three conditions are equivalent.
(1) µ is a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium of G.
(2) µ is a strong perfect equilibrium of G.
(3) µ is the limit of a sequence (µ n ) in M with the property that for each i and every > 0,
for any sufficiently large n.
equilibrium µ of G, take ν ∈ M and a sequence (0, 1) δ n → 0, and observe that each
is an n -equilibrium of G δ n ν for some n → 0, and we have (1 − δ n )µ + δ n ν → µ.
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The following example illustrates that the set of thp equilibria of an infinite game may well be a (strict) refinement of the Nash set. 
It is easily seen that the strategy profile (0, 1) is a (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium of G. Note however that
and that the inequality is strict if x 1 > 0. Therefore, player 2's best response to any tremble of player 1 in any Selten perturbation of G cannot be the action 1. Thus, the equilibrium (0, 1) is not thp.
The graph of G is the set
The graph of the mixed extension G, Γ G , is defined analogously. The closures of Γ G and Γ G are denoted Γ G and Γ G respectively. Given A, B ⊆ R ε, we write A > ε and A > B − ε for a > ε, for all a ∈ A, and a > b − ε, for all (a, b) ∈ A × B, respectively. The definitions of A ≥ ε and A ≥ B − ε are analogous.
The following definition appears in Reny [20] .
The following proposition suggests that the existence of equilibria surviving trembling-hand perfectness crucially depends on the existence of Nash equilibria in Selten perturbations of G.
Proposition 1.
Suppose that G is a compact, metric game. If G is betterreply secure and there exists (α, µ) ∈ (0, 1) × M such that G δµ has a purestrategy Nash equilibrium for every 0 ≤ δ ≤ α, then G possesses a tremblinghand perfect equilibrium, and all trembling-hand perfect equilibria of G are Nash.
Proof. Let (α, µ) be as in the statement of the proposition. Then, each G 1 n µ (n large enough) possesses a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium n . Because n ∈ M and M is sequentially compact, we may write (passing to a subsequence if necessary) n → for some ∈ M . Therefore, is a thp equilibrium of G. To see that all thp equilibria of G are Nash, suppose that is a thp equilibrium of G, and let n be the corresponding sequence of equilibria in Selten perturbations, i.e., each n is a Nash equilibrium of G δ n µ n , where δ n → 0 and µ n ∈ M . We wish to show that is a Nash equilibrium of G. To this end, we assume that is not an equilibrium and derive a contradiction.
Because n → and each u i is bounded, we may write (passing to a subsequence if necessary)
for some α := (α 1 , ..., α N ) ∈ R N . Consequently, ( , α) ∈ Γ G , and hence, if is not a Nash equilibrium of G, then (since G is better-reply secure) some player i can secure a payoff strictly above α i at . That is, for some σ i ∈ M i , some neighborhood O −i of −i , and some γ > 0,
We therefore have, in view of (1),
for any sufficiently large n and some β > 0. Consequently, for large enough n,
thereby contradicting that n is a (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium in G δ n µ n .
In light of Proposition 1, it is only natural to ask whether the machinery developed within the literature on the existence of Nash equilibria in discontinuous games can be employed to show that Selten perturbations of G possess Nash equilibria. Reny ([20] , Corollary 5.2) proves that if G is compact and Hausdorff, then G possesses a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium if G is better-reply secure. By Proposition 1, therefore, it would suffice to have slight Selten perturbations of G satisfying better-reply security.
4 Lemma 1. If G is a compact, metric game and there exists (α, µ) ∈ (0, 1) × M such that G δµ is better-reply secure for every 0 ≤ δ ≤ α, then G possesses a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium, and all trembling-hand perfect equilibria of G are Nash.
In general, verifying the existence of (α, µ) ∈ (0, 1) × M for which every G δµ , 0 ≤ δ ≤ α, is better-reply secure is cumbersome, for it entails dealing with expected payoffs (defined on mixed strategies) and the weak* convergence of measures. Consequently, rather than imposing better-reply security directly on G δµ , one would like to have conditions on the payoffs of the original game G that (1) prove useful in applications and (2) imply better-reply security in perturbations of G.
Unfortunately, G δµ need not inherit better-reply security from G, and even standard strengthenings of better-reply security-payoff security or uniform payoff security (to be defined below), along with upper semicontinuity of i u i -do not generally give the desired property in G δµ . It is instructive to see how these conditions fail better-reply security in G δµ .
The following definition is taken from Reny [20] .
Definition 5. The game G is payoff secure if for each ε > 0, x ∈ X, and i, there exists
It is well-known (Reny [20] , Corollary 5.2 and Proposition 5.1) that payoff security of G and upper semicontinuity of i u i ensure better-reply security of G. However, the mixed extension G need not be better-reply secure when G is payoff secure and i u i is upper semicontinuous. The following example illustrates this point.
Example 2 (Sion and Wolfe [23]). Consider the game
, where
This game is zero-sum (and so i u i is constant) and payoff secure (Carmona [11] , Proposition 4). Moreover, as shown by Sion and Wolfe [23] , G has no Nash equilibria (and hence, by Corollary 5.2 of Reny [20] , G fails better-reply security). Now consider the following strengthening of payoff security (cf. Monteiro and Page [17] ). Definition 6. Given Y i ⊆ X i for each i, the game G is uniformly payoff secure over × i Y i if for each i, ε > 0, and x i ∈ Y i , there exists y i ∈ X i such that for every
The game G is uniformly payoff secure if it is uniformly payoff secure over X.
Uniform payoff security of G yields payoff security of the mixed extension G ( [17] , Theorem 1). By standard arguments, this means that uniform payoff security of G, together with upper semicontinuity of i u i , implies betterreply security in G. Nonetheless, these two conditions need not lead to better-reply security of G δµ , as illustrated by the following example. 
elsewhere, (Figure 2 ). It is easy to verify that i u i is upper semicontinuous and G is uniformly payoff secure. However, G δµ fails to be payoff secure whenever µ ∈ M and δ ∈ (0, 1). To see this, fix µ = (µ 1 , µ 2 ) ∈ M and δ ∈ (0, 1). We need to show that there exist ε, i, and ν ∈ M (δµ) such that for all σ i ∈ M i (δµ i ) there is a point
for some
Choose ε > 0 with the property that for any large enough n,
Take any neighborhood O (1−δ)α n +δµ 2 of (1 − δ)α n + δµ 2 and any y 1 ∈ [0, 1]. Clearly, we may pick some y 2 ∈ (α n , α n+1 ) sufficiently close to α n to ensure that (1 − δ)y 2 + δµ 2 ∈ O (1−δ)α n +δµ 2 . By linearity of U 1 we have
On the other hand, we have
and since the right-hand side of this equation is, in light of (3), greater than or equal to the right-hand side of (4), the desired inequality, (2), follows. We conclude that G δµ is not payoff secure.
The perturbation G δµ also fails better-reply security. To see this, choose µ = (µ 1 , µ 2 ) ∈ M and δ ∈ (0, 1), and observe that
where γ
and γ
belongs to Γ G δµ . Moreover, the strategy profile
is not a Nash equilibrium in G δµ , for
Reasoning as in the previous paragraph one can show that for large enough n there is no
It follows that G δµ is not better-reply secure.
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By Example 3, any condition on the payoff functions of G leading to the hypothesis of Lemma 1 (when combined with upper semicontinuity of i u i ) must be stronger than uniform payoff security. 6 While G is quasi-symmetric in the sense of Reny [20] (and so G δµ can be made quasisymmetric), G δµ also violates diagonal better-reply security (as defined in [20] ).
7 This means that the machinery developed within the literature on the existence of Nash equilibria cannot be employed to establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium in G δµ under the assumption that G is uniformly payoff secure and i u i is upper semicontinuous. We ignore if uniform payoff security of G and upper semicontinuity of i u i implies the existence of a thp equilibrium in G. If this were true, its proof would require an appropriate generalization of the main theorem of Reny [20] .
Condition (A).
There exists (µ 1 , ..., µ N ) ∈ M such that for each i and every ε > 0 there is a Borel measurable map f : X i → X i such that the following is satisfied:
(a) For each x i ∈ X i and every y −i ∈ X −i , there is a neighborhood O y −i of y −i for which
It is clear that (A) strengthens the concept of uniform payoff security.
Remark 2. The following implications are immediate:
continuity ⇒ (A) ⇒ uniform payoff security ⇒ payoff security.
We can establish payoff security of a Selten perturbation of G from Condition (A).
Lemma 2. Suppose that a compact, metric game G satisfies Condition (A). Then there exists µ ∈ M such that G δµ is payoff secure for every δ ∈ [0, 1).
This result plays a central role in the proof of the main results of this paper. We present a sketch of its proof in this section (after the statement of Theorem 2) and relegate the details to Subsection 4.1.
Lemma 2 can be combined with known results to prove an existence theorem. In fact, under the hypothesis of Lemma 2, we obtain payoff security 8 The following generalization of Condition (A) leaves all of our results intact.
Condition (A'
). There exists (µ 1 , ..., µ N ) ∈ M such that for each i and every ε > 0 there is a sequence (f k ) of Borel measurable maps f k : X i → X i such that the following is satisfied:
(a) For each k, x i ∈ X i , and y −i ∈ X −i , there is a neighborhood O y−i of y −i for which
(b) For each y −i ∈ X −i , there is a subset Y i of X i with µ i (Y i ) = 1 such that for each x i ∈ Y i and every sufficiently large k, there is a neighborhood V y−i of y −i such that
of G δµ (for any 0 ≤ δ < 1). If in addition i u i is upper semicontinuous, since upper semicontinuity of i u i gives upper semicontinuity of i U i (Reny [20] , Proposition 5.1), it follows that G δµ is better-reply secure (for any 0 ≤ δ < 1) (Reny [20] , Corollary 5.2). Applying Lemma 1 gives a thp equilibrium in G.
The following statement summarizes this finding.
Theorem 2. Suppose that a compact, metric game G satisfies Condition (A). Suppose further that i u i is upper semicontinuous. Then G has a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium, and all trembling-hand perfect equilibria of G are Nash.
We now give an outline of the proof of Lemma 2. The main argument relies on the following intermediate result:
( ) Suppose that G is compact, metric, and satisfies Condition (A). Then there exists (µ 1 , ..., µ N ) ∈ M such that for each i and every ε > 0 there is a Borel measurable map f : X i → X i such that the following is satisfied:
( .1) For each x i ∈ X i and every
This is Lemma 5 of Subsection 4.1. In general, uniform payoff security does not give item ( .1) (in fact, uniform payoff security implies the existence of a map f with above properties, except that this map need not be Borel measurable) or item ( .2). Fix δ ∈ [0, 1), and let µ = (µ 1 , ..., µ N ) ∈ M be the measure given by ( ). We need to show that G δµ is payoff secure. We fix ε > 0, σ = (σ 1 , ..., σ N ) ∈ M (δµ), and i, and show that there exists
From ( ) we see that there is a Borel measurable map f : X i → X i satisfying the following:
(i ) For every y i ∈ X i , there is a neighborhood O σ −i of σ −i for which
Because σ ∈ M (δµ), there exists, for each i, i ∈ M i such that
. Using (i ) one can show the following: (a) There exists a neighborhood O σ −i of σ −i such that
(This is Claim 1 in the proof of Lemma 2.)
In light of (a) and (ii ), the proof of Lemma 2 can be completed as follows. 
In addition, the definition of υ f i and the equality σ i = (1 − δ) i + δµ i entail
Consequently, for every p −i in some neighborhood of σ −i we have
Here, the first inequality follows from (5), the second inequality is given by (a), and the equality is a consequence of (6). Hence, because p
The remainder of this section derives a corollary of Theorem 2 in terms of two independent conditions-generic entire payoff security and generic local equi-upper semicontinuity-that imply Condition (A). While stronger, the alternative hypothesis applies to a variety of economic games and does not explicitly require the measurability of the map f from Condition (A), and proves useful in applications. Both Theorem 2 and its corollary (Corollary 1) are illustrated in Section 3.
Let A i be the set of all accumulation points of X i (i.e., the set A i of points
Since X i is compact and metric, it can be written as a disjoint union A i ∪ K i , where A i is closed and dense in itself (i.e., with no isolated points) and K i is countable.
Let M i be the set of measures µ i in M i such that µ i ({x i }) = 0 and µ i (N (x i )) > 0 for each x i ∈ A i and every > 0, and µ i ({x i }) > 0 for every
Clearly, M i is a subset of M i . Moreover, M i is nonempty. In fact, it is not difficult to show that M i is dense in M i for each i. Definition 7. Given Y i ⊆ X i for each i, we say that G is entirely payoff secure over × i Y i if for each i, ε > 0, and x i ∈ Y i , and for every neighborhood O of x i , there exist y i ∈ O and a neighborhood O x i of x i such that for every y −i ∈ X −i , there is a neighborhood O y −i of y −i for which
We say that G is entirely payoff secure if it is entirely payoff secure over X. A game G is generically entirely payoff secure if it is entirely payoff secure over × i K i and generically entirely payoff secure over × i A i (recall that X i = A i ∪ K i , where A i is closed and dense in itself and K i is countable).
Remark 3. The following implications are immediate:
continuity ⇒ entire payoff security ⇒ generic entire payoff security ⇒ uniform payoff security ⇒ payoff security.
Definition 9. The game G is locally equi-upper semicontinuous if for each i, x −i ∈ X −i , and x i ∈ X i , and for each ε > 0, there exists a neighborhood O x i of x i such that for every 
It turns out that generic entire payoff security and generic local equi-upper semicontinuity imply Condition (A).
Lemma 3. Suppose that G is generically entirely payoff secure and generically locally equi-upper semicontinuous. Then G satisfies Condition (A).
The proof of Lemma 3 is relegated to Subsection 4.2. Lemma 3, combined with Theorem 2, gives the following result.
Corollary 1 (to Theorem 2). Suppose that G is compact, metric, generically entirely payoff secure, and generically locally equi-upper semicontinuous. Suppose further that i u i is upper semicontinuous. Then G has a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium, and all trembling-hand perfect equilibria of G are Nash. 
Applications
The hypotheses of our main results are often satisfied in applications. This is illustrated by the following economic games. 
and
The map π(p) represents the operating profits that a monopolist charging a price p would earn (Figure 3 ). The two (identical) firms produce at zero costs, and the associated demand function is
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE.]
Similar duopoly games can be found in Baye and Morgan [7] . See also [7] for a discussion on economic phenomena that may cause demand discontinuities.
It is readily seen that i u i is upper semicontinuous. Moreover, G is entirely payoff secure. To see this, fix i, ε > 0, p i ∈ [0, 4], and a neighborhood O of p i . We wish to show that there exist a i ∈ O and a neighborhood O p i around p i such that for every
This is clearly true if p i = 0, for u i ≥ 0. Assume p i > 0, and choose a i ∈ O with 0 < a i < p i sufficiently close to p i to ensure that π( 
It is straightforward to verify that (7) holds. Finally, G is generically locally equi-upper semicontinuous. In fact, take
Because G is generically locally equi-upper semicontinuous and entirely payoff secure, Corollary 1 can be invoked to establish the existence of a thp equilibrium.
Example 5 (all-pay auction). There are N bidders competing for an object with a known value equal to 1. The highest bidder wins and every bidder pays his bid. Ties are broken via an equal probability rule. 
we have
We now show that G is generically entirely payoff secure. 9 Fix a player i, and choose ε > 0, b i ∈ (0, 1), and a neighborhood O of b i (we omit the case when b i ∈ {0, 1}, which is easy to handle). We wish to show that there exist
Choose
N −1 , and let O b −i be a neighborhood of b −i with the following property:
It is easy to verify that the choices of a i , O b i , and O b −i yield equation (8) .
Finally, it is routine to verify that the sum of the bidders' payoffs is continuous. Hence, Corollary 1 gives a thp equilibrium.
Example 6 (catalog games). Page and Monteiro [18] consider a common agency contracting game in which firms compete for the business of an agent of unknown type t ∈ T , where T is a Borel subset of a separable, complete, and metric space. The distribution of types is represented by a Borel probability measure µ defined on T . There are two firms competing simultaneously in prices and products. The set of products each firm can offer is represented by a compact metric space X, and it is assumed that X contains an element 0, which denotes 'no contracting.' The universe of prices that a firm can charge is denoted as D := 0, d , with d ∈ R ++ . The agent can only contract with one firm and can choose to abstain from contracting altogether. Given i = 1, 2 and a closed subset X i of X, let K i := X i × D be the feasible set of products and prices that a firm i can offer. Assume the existence of a fictitious firm i = 0 with feasible set K 0 := {(0, 0)}. The agent chooses to abstain from contracting by choosing to contract with firm i = 0.
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Each firm i competes by offering the agent a nonempty, closed subset C i ⊆ K i , a catalog, of products and prices. Thus, each firm i's action space is P(K i ), the compact, metric space of catalogs, equipped with the Hausdorff distance. The utility of a type t agent who chooses (i, x, p) ∈ {0, 1, 2} × C i is denoted as v t (i, x, p); we have v t (i, x, p) := 0 if i = 0 and v t (i, x, p) := u t (i, x) − p if i = 1, 2. It is assumed that utility is measurable in type t and continuous in contract choice (i, x, p). The agent's choice set given catalog profile (C 1 , C 2 ) is given by
A type t agent chooses (i, x, p) ∈ Γ(C 1 , C 2 ) to maximize her utility:
v t (i, x, p).
10
The map v * (t, ·) represents a type t agent's indirect utility function over profiles of catalogs, while Φ(t, ·) gives the type t agent's best responses to each catalog profile. The j-th firm's profit function is given by
where the cost function c j (·) is bounded and lower semicontinuous. Let
23
The game G = (P(K i ), Π i ) is an upper semicontinuous, compact game. Moreover, an argument similar to that provided in the proof of Theorem 5 of [18] to establish uniform payoff security of G can be utilized to prove that G satisfies Condition (A). Consequently, by Theorem 2, the game possesses a thp equilibrium.
Example 7 (provision of public goods). Bagnoli and Lipman [4] studies the following contribution game. There are I (finitely many) agents. Each agent i ∈ I is endowed with an amount of wealth w i > 0. A collective decision d ∈ {0, 1} must be made (say, d = 1 designates the decision to provide streetlight, d = 0 represents the decision not to provide it). An outcome is a social decision together with an allocation of the private good (wealth) among the agents. The set of feasible outcomes is Let S := × i∈I S i . The associated normal-form game is G = (S i , u i ) i∈I , where u i : S → R is defined by
Bagnoli and Lipman [4] uses an equilibrium concept-termed undominated perfect equilibrium-that eliminates the set of weakly dominated strategies in the original game and applies the notion of perfectness to the resulting game.
To avoid defining trembling-hand perfectness in infinite games and dealing with the issue of existence, Bagnoli and Lipman work with approximating finite versions of G. Specifically, assuming v i (0, w i ) = 0 for each i (a normalization that does not affect generality) and v i (1, 0) < 0 for each i (so that we do not need to consider cases when some agents would like to contribute more than their wealth) we can define a i implicitly by v i (1, w i − a i ) = 0. Assume i w i > c. Clearly, the elimination of the interior of the set of weakly dominated strategies in G removes all s i ∈ S i such that s i > a i . Consider the subgame g of G in which i's strategy space is restricted to [0, a i ] and g is otherwise identical to G.
Bagnoli and Lipman replace each S i by finite counterparts of varying grid sizes, and consider sequences of finite games in which the grid size converges to zero. They define an undominated perfect equilibrium in G as the limit of some sequence of undominated perfect equilibria of approximating finite versions of G. Thus, their equilibrium notion coincides with the lof approach applied to g.
The authors' main result is that the game form G fully implements the core of the associated economy in undominated perfect equilibrium (i.e., any undominated perfect equilibrium of G induces a core allocation and viceversa). In view of our results, one may ask the following: Can one apply the characterization exercise conducted in [4] directly on the infinite game g? Can one obtain a similar theorem on the full implementation of the core in terms of limit admissible perfectness? While answering these questions requires a thorough analysis, Theorem 2 can be used to establish the existence of a thp equilibrium in g.
It is easily seen that the restriction of u i to [0, a i ] is upper semicontinuous, so the sum of payoffs for g is upper semicontinuous.
We now show that g is entirely payoff secure. Take i, ε > 0, s i ∈ [0, a i ], and a neighborhood O of s i . Clearly, there exist b i ∈ O and a neighborhood O s i of s i such that for every
The cases when s i ∈ {0, a i } are easy to handle, so suppose that s i ∈ (0, a i ). Take b i ∈ O with a i > b i > s i close enough to s i to ensure that 
Consider the set of all s i ∈ [0, a i ] such that j s j = c, a set that has full Lebesgue measure (i.e., it has µ i -measure 1), and take any s i in this set and ε > 0. We only consider the case when j s j > c (the case when j s j < c can be dealt with analogously). Clearly, we may choose a neighborhood O s i of s i in [0, a i ] such that and b i + j =i s j > c and
Consequently, for every b −i ∈ O s −i , we have
In light of Theorem 2, therefore, we obtain the nonemptiness of the set of perfect equilibria in g. and so it suffices to establish the lemma when f is a simple function.
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Suppose that f is simple with standard representation f = k a k χ A k . For each k, choose x k ∈ A k . Given y ∈ X, let δ y stand for the Dirac measure on X with support {y}. Define the Borel probability measure ν on X as follows:
Then ν has finite support, and it is clear that X f dν = X f dµ. Furthermore, there is no loss of generality in assuming that ν ∈ N ε (µ), for if ν did not belong to N ε (µ), one could successively refine the partition (A k ) of X and define the corresponding finite measures analogously, thereby generating a sequence (ν n ) of finitely supported measures with limit point µ such that X f dν n = X f dµ for each n. We conclude that there is a finitely supported measure ν ∈ N ε (µ) satisfying | X f dµ − X f dν| < ε. It is now easy to see that there is a measure ν * in P * (X) with the same support as ν such that X f dν * − X f dµ < ε.
Lemma 5. Suppose that G is compact, metric, and satisfies Condition (A).
Then there exists (µ 1 , ..., µ N ) ∈ M such that for each i and every ε > 0 there is a map f : X i → X i such that the following is satisfied:
(i ) For each x i ∈ X i and every σ −i ∈ M −i , there is a neighborhood O σ −i of σ −i for which
(ii ) For every σ −i ∈ M −i , there is a neighborhood V σ −i of σ −i such that U i (µ Proof. Since G satisfies (A), there exists (µ 1 , ..., µ N ) ∈ M such that for each i and every ε > 0 there is a map f (i,ε) : X i → X i such that the following is satisfied:
(a) For each x i ∈ X i and every y −i ∈ X −i , there is a neighborhood O y −i of y −i for which u i (f (i,ε) (x i ), O y −i ) > u i (x i , y −i ) − ε. 
In fact, the negation of this inequality implies that there is a sequence (y (i,ε) B ∩ f (i,ε) (X i ) . We conclude that for each (i, ε) and every y −i ∈ X −i , there is a neighborhood V y −i of y −i such that U i (µ f (i,ε) , z −i ) − U i (µ i , z −i ) < ε, for all z −i ∈ V y −i . is lower semicontinuous, so is the map p −i → X −i ξ f (i, 1 n ) dp −i defined on M −i (cf. Aliprantis and Border [1] , Theorem 15.5). Consequently,
for every ν −i in some neighborhood O σ −i of σ −i . Hence, since
, for all y −i ∈ X −i , we obtain, for every ν −i ∈ O σ −i , and for any large enough n,
Proof. Fix δ ∈ [0, 1), and let µ = (µ 1 , ..., µ N ) ∈ M be the measure given by Condition (A). We fix ε > 0, σ = (σ 1 , ..., σ N ) ∈ M (δµ), and i, and show that there exists ν i ∈ M i (δµ i ) such that U i ν i , O σ −i > U i (σ) − ε for some neighborhood O σ −i of σ −i .
Lemma 5 gives a Borel measurable map f : X i → X i satisfying the following:
.
